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Recent Decisions
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSmiLrry OF AFFIDAVITS
USED TO REFRESH PRESENT RECOLLECTION OF WITNESSES AT
TRIAL- Wilson v. State.1
After an argument on a hot summer evening in Baltimore's
West Forest Park, Thomas Wilson shot and killed Joe "Bunky"
Harris. During the early morning hours of the following day the
police interviewed three eyewitnesses to the shooting. Their state-
ments to the police were reduced to affidavits and sworn to by the
witnesses. They described how Wilson went into his own house,
returned with a rifle, and fired it at the deceased.' The admissi-
bility of two of these statements became the main issue on ap-
peal. The Court of Special Appeals held the affidavits inadmissi-
ble, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case for a new
trial.3
At Wilson's trial on a charge of second degree murder in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore City, the Assistant State's Attorney
filed a motion requesting that the court call the three eyewit-
nesses to the shooting as its own witnesses. The ground for this
motion was that the State could not vouch for their veracity
because they had been intimidated. The court called the wit-
nesses,4 and after direct examination by the trial judge, the three
were cross-examined by the State and then by the defense. The
State began cross-examination of the first witness by having him
identify the affidavit that he had given to the police. During the
questioning, the prosecution quoted from the affidavit in order to
1. 20 Md. App. 318, 315 A.2d 788 (1974).
2. The incident occurred on July 10, 1972. Wilson, age twenty-one, was brought to
trial on January 8, 1973. He claimed self-defense. Three days later the jury found him
guilty of murdering Harris, age twenty, and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
3. 20 Md. App. at 320, 315 A.2d at 789.
4. Although the defense counsel objected to this procedure, the discretionary author-
ity of trial judges to call and examine witnesses is well established. In fact, research
disclosed no cases denying this authority. See Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 538, 540 (1959); 2
WHARTON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 503 (13th ed. 1972). This tactic is often used to allow a
party to avoid the rule against impeachment of its own witness. 42 HARv. L. REv. 445
(1929). In the present case this would have been likely had the prosecution called the
reluctant witnesses. It would appear that there are no Maryland cases dealing with this
procedure, but there is ample authority in other jurisdictions. See Commonwealth v.
DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 230 A.2d 449 (1967); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676,
109 S.E. 201 (1921); Fortune v. Fortune, 138 A.2d 390 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958). Also
Maryland has several times affirmed the trial judge's authority to intervene in questioning
of a witness and to conduct his own examination. Indeed, the only limits to this
discretion seem to be that the court should not ask questions relating to the witness'
credibility, thereby destroying the court's impartiality in the eyes of the jury. See Jeffries
v. State, 5 Md. App. 630, 248 A.2d 807 (1969); King v. State, 16 Md. App. 533, 298 A.2d
470 (1973).
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evoke more affirmative responses from the witness than those
given under direct examination. The second witness was also
cross-examined in this manner. The third witness testified with-
out the State making use of his affidavit to the police, or offering
it in evidence. At the close of the State's cross-examination of the
first two witnesses, the trial court, over the defense's objections,
received their prior statements in evidence. The purpose was lim-
ited to impeachment of the witnesses' trial testimony, which the
trial court believed to be inconsistent with the affidavits. The
judge, however, failed to instruct the jury as to the special use of
such evidence. Even though the defense counsel failed either to
request such an instruction or to object to the failure of the court
to give such an instruction, the law relied upon in the appeal was
primarily the law limiting the use of prior inconsistent state-
ments.'
The Court of Special Appeals differed with the trial court in
5. 20 Md. App. at 326, 315 A.2d at 793. There were three other bases for the appeal,
as follows:
a. That the trial judge's expressions of incredulity during the testimony of appel-
lant's mother constituted reversible error. Citing Md. R. P. 1085, the Court of Special
Appeals held that the defense counsel's failure to make a formal objection prevented the
court from ruling on the question. 20 Md. App. at 332, 315 A.2d at 796.
b. That the testimony of a defense witness was improperly excluded as hearsay. The
court held that exclusion of the testimony was error. 20 Md. App. at 332, 315 A.2d at 796.
c. That, at a hearing on appellant's motion for a new trial, the court erred in refusing
to consider the results of a polygraph test made after conclusion of the trial. The court,
citing Ragler v. State, 18 Md. App. 71, 308 A.2d 401 (1973), held that evidence of poly-
graph examinations is inadmissible and, therefore, it affords no basis for the award of a
new trial. 20 Md. App. at 334, 315 A.2d at 797.
That the defense listed this as a basis for appeal does not seem so strange in light of
three recent federal decisions on the question of admissibility at trial of polygraph-related
evidence. See United States v. DeBentham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (1972), aff'd 471 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972); and United
States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (D.C. Mich. 1972). Although Zeiger was later reversed
(375 F.2d 1280), and in DeBentham the evidence was excluded, these three federal cases
proposed new standards of admissibility by conducting pre-trial hearings to establish the
probative value of such evidence.
Currently, Maryland courts, and those in most other jurisdictions, do not admit
testimony concerning polygraph examinations. The rule stems from the failure of such
evidence to meet the standard of reliability set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The most recent Maryland case taking this position is Rawlings v. State,
7 Md. App. 611, 256 A.2d 704 (1969). In the present case the Court of Special Appeals
deftly avoided dealing with the new federal cases by holding polygraph evidence com-
pletely irrelevant to the issue of a new trial. For further information on this potentially
changing subject, see Note, The Polygraph Technique-A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE
L.J. 330 (1971); REiD AND INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION, (1966); Skolnich, Scientific Theory
and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 699-703 (1961).
Wilson's conviction, however, was reversed solely by reason of the finding of error in
the trial court's admission of the affidavits in evidence. 20 Md. App. at 320, 315 A.2d at
789.
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interpreting the testimony of the witnesses. After briefly discuss-
ing the law relating to prior inconsistent statements, the appel-
late court decided that the use of such statements should be
restricted to impeachment of the witness' credibility, and that
they could not be admissible as substantive evidence However,
the court did not have to reach this question in the case at bar
because it concluded that the affidavits and trial testimony were
consistent as determined by the "whole impression or effect." 7
But while technically dictum the court's discussion of the use of
inconsistent statements is significant because it indicates that
the Court of Special Appeals will not allow the admission of in-
consistent statements as substantive evidence.
The court said that the prosecution, in effect, had used the
affidavits to refresh the witnesses' present recollections of the
shooting; and while this in itself was a perfectly legitimate use of
the affidavits, they should not have been introduced into evi-
dence.' They could not have been admitted under the theory of
past recollection recorded because admissibility under this theory
6. By way of dicta, this amounts to a reaffirmation of Maryland's adoption of the
orthodox view along with the great majority of jurisdictions. See West v. Belle Isle Cab
Co., 203 Md. 244, 100 A.2d 17 (1953). See also 82 HAxv. L. Rlv. 472 (1968). The court
conceded that the minority view allowing the substantive use of prior inconsistent state-
ments has the support of many legal commentators, on the theory that the usual hearsay
dangers are largely non-existent where the witness testifies at trial. See Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 177, 193 (1949);
3A J. WMoRE, EvIDENCE, § 1018 (Chadbourne rev. 1970); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 251
(1972).
The minority view has been accepted notably in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964). Although DeSisto
speaks in terms of prior inconsistent statements, it actually involves admissibility of
extra-judicial identifications. The Court's of Special Appeals dicta rejecting DeSisto could
confuse Maryland's treatment of extra-judicial identifications with its stand on prior
inconsistent statements. The minority view was recently bolstered by California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970), where all but one justice agreed that a defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation is not necessarily inconsistent with California's adoption of the minority
view. See Comment, Substantive Use of Witness' Prior Inconsistent Statement Does Not
Violate the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 LoYoLA U. L.J.
(Chicago) 238 (1971).
7. The court here cited 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
The court construed the more affirmative statements in the affidavits as mere inferences
from observation which were verified in the witness' testimony. 20 Md. App. at 328, 315
A.2d at 794. This seems somewhat strained, and it is possibly taking the appellate court
beyond the bounds of its competency. The trial judge, in ruling on the inconsistencies had
the benefit of observing such factors as the witness' demeanor, which do not appear in
the record, but which are part of the "whole impression or effect."
8. More specifically, the affidavits were ruled inadmissible with regard to the offer-
ing party. The opposing counsel can nearly always introduce prior statements into evi-
dence for the same reason that allows him to examine it. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
763 (3d ed. 1940).
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requires that the witness' memory has not been refreshed.'
The court said that the memory of the two witnesses was
refreshed by the reference to the affidavits, thus their testimony
was independent of their prior statements and could not be
proved by these statements. As such, the affidavits were inadmis-
sible, and it was error to receive them. 0
Maryland courts as far back as 1814 have allowed witnesses
to refer to notes, prior testimony, or the like in order to refresh
present recollection at trial." Because Maryland has followed the
common law rule that such use fails to render the materials ad-
missible, 2 the courts generally have placed few restraints on the
procedures of refreshing recollection and left the entire affair to
the sound discretion of the trial judge.13 Despite this flexibility
most prosecutors would presumably try to avoid the use of prior
statements to refresh the memory of a witness on the stand, using
them instead at pretrial interviews. Perhaps the use of such mate-
rial at trial occurs most often where the testimony is too long and
complicated for the witness adequately to recollect without the
aid of notes or memoranda during examination.
9. In most jurisdictions, past recollection recorded involves the situation where the
witness' memory is not refreshed by reference to a memorandum, but he recalls the
memorandum and recalls that it was accurate when made, making the memorandum
admissible by reason of necessity. See Askins v. State, 13 Md. App. 702, 709, 284 A.2d
626, 630 (1971). Maryland has long held prior statements admissible on this basis.
Cogswell v. Frazier, 183 Md. 654, 39 A.2d 815 (1944); Holler v. Miller, 177 Md. 204, 9 A.2d
250 (1939).
10. Despite additional testimony by the third eyewitness, whose affidavit was not
offered in evidence, the court rejected the State's argument that the error was harmless
and not prejudicial to the appellant. Citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967),
the court held that "admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the
jury violated the appellant's right to a fair and impartial jury trial." 20 Md. App. at 331,
315 A.2d at 790.
11. See Tolley v. Ford, 1 Harr. & J. 413 (Md. 1814).
12. Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty 124 (Md. 1810).
13. There is a tendency among a few courts to restrict such use. See R. DONIGAN AND
E. FISCHER, THE EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 114 (The Traffic Inst. Northwestern Univ. 1965).
This seems to have arisen from a failure to distinguish between refreshment of recollection
and past recollection recorded. Generally in order for a memorandum to be used merely
for refreshment, the trial court need only determine that the witness' memory is indeed
exhausted and that the prior statements will actually refresh present recollection without
being too suggestive. C. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 9 (2d ed. 1972).
On the other hand, where a witness' memory is not refreshed by the prior memoran-
dum, but he can vouch for its accuracy, the evidence can be admitted as past recollection
recorded. This type of evidence must be the result of the witness' first-hand knowledge of
the event, and the memorandum must be an original made at or near the time of the event,
while the witness had an accurate memory of it. Id. § 299.
In view of the failure of many decisions to adequately distinguish these two concepts,
and the differences of opinion in making such a distinction, it is recommended that cases
dealing with refreshment of recollection be read in conjunction with cases from the same
jurisdiction on past recollection recorded.
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In suggesting that prior statements used to refresh the recol-
lection of a witness on the stand are inadmissible'4 (unless they
are independently admissible'5), the Court of Special Appeals has
indicated that it follows the trend in the great majority of juris-
dictions and purports to rest on its own stare decisis.'8 Neverthe-
less, there are at least two Maryland cases that confuse the his-
tory of this point; Owens v. State" (1887) and Hall v. State"
(1960), both handed down by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Owens v. State involved voting fraud with a poll-watcher's
record as the prior memorandum. The witness did not claim to
be able to remember his tabulations, and the court allowed him
to read his testimony from notes made at the poll. Despite the
fact that the situation more closely resembled past recollection
recorded," the opinion included dictum saying that the admissi-
bility of such evidence does not depend on whether the witness
has no present memory of the occurrence. If the witness swears
14. This is not to be confused with admissibility of prior identifications by a witness.
For a discussion of Maryland's use of such evidence see Comment, Admissibility of Extra-
judicial Identification as Substantive Evidence, 19 MD. L. REv. 201 (1959). Normally prior
identifications are admissible not only for credibility or impeachment purposes, but also
as substantive evidence. See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958); Bullock v.
State, 219 Md. 67, 148 A.2d 433 (1959). Inasmuch as a prior identification is one type of
prior consistent statement, it would seem that the evidentiary problems would be basi-
cally the same for both. The Court of Special Appeals did not deal with this issue.
15. E.g., res gestae (as an exception to the hearsay rule) Black's Law Dictionary 1469
(4th ed. 1968); in federal court, business records under 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970); complaints
by victims in certain cases (such as where they may involve identifications) see note 14,
supra; and previous statements to rebut a suggestion that testimony given in court was
recently fabricated. Gooderson, Previous Consistent Statements, 26 CABmRDE L. J. 64
(1968).
A variation of this third independent basis for admission was discussed in United
States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946). In this case the court held that when the
prior statement used to refresh the witness' memory was an account of the relevant
occasion, its falsity, if raised by the opposing party, will become an issue, and the other
party is entitled to meet the attack by introducing the statement into evidence. In the
present case also, the defense counsel made efforts to discredit the affidavits. 20 Md. App.
at 328, 315 A.2d at 794. Maryland has a similar rule which might, therefore, have been
used to draw the affidavits into evidence. See, e.g., Louis Eckels and Sons Ice Mfg. Co.
v. Cornell Economizer Co., 119 Md. 106, 114-16, 86 A. 38, 40-41 (1912); United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Md. 24, 32, 190 A. 768, 772 (1937). This court
questioned the logic behind this rule in a 1971 case, Sobus v. Knisley, 11 Md. App. 134,
138, 273 A.2d 227, 230 (1971).
16. See Askins v. State, 13 Md. App. 702, 710-11, 284 A.2d 626, 631 (1971); Hubbard
v. State, 2 Md. App. 364, 367-68, 234 A.2d 775, 777 (1967). For a comprehensive list of
cases on the subject see 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 512 (1962), supplementing 125 A.L.R. 19, 28
(1940).
17. 67 Md. 307, 10 A. 210 (1887).
18. 223 Md. 158, 162 A.2d 151 (1960).
19. 67 Md. at 312, 10 A. at 213.
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that he made the entry in accordance with the truth of the matter
as he knew it, then the memorandum is admissible as a means
of confirmation of what he states from memory.20
In Hall v. State, a homicide detective took extensive notes
of the defendant's oral statements. As a witness, the detective
stated that although he had some recollection of the event he
could testify with greater accuracy using his notes. He was al-
lowed to read them to the jury, and the court said that they could
have been admitted directly into evidence as documents. 1 Quot-
ing Owens with approval, the opinion stated that "whether he
retains a present recollection of the facts or not, the entry or
memorandum is admissible. '1 2
In Wilson the court rejected admission of such evidence be-
cause the witnesses claimed better or equal present recollection
of the event. The decision made no direct reference to the above
cases. While Wilson certainly expresses the prevailing view, 3 per-
haps the point is not so well settled in Maryland. In fact Profes-
sor Wigmore, citing Owens, classifies Maryland in the minority
on this issue .2
The witnesses in Wilson as well as in Hall and Owens
confirmed the accuracy of their prior memoranda. In the latter
two cases they claimed that the writings would conform more
closely with reality. In Wilson, the eyewitnesses' trial testimony
varied somewhat with the affidavits, but remained largely consis-
tent. The witnesses apparently did not claim greater accuracy for
the affidavits, and the Court of Special Appeals found their ad-
mission into evidence to be reversible error. Comparing the nar-
row holdings reveals some distinction between the cases, but the
broader dicta in Wilson that present memory precludes admitting
the prior consistent statement directly contradicts the dicta in
Hall and Owens.
Under the majority view, the prior statement is hearsay be-
cause it was not made under oath, and was not subject to cross-
examination in the presence of the trier of fact. On the other
hand, once the witness affirms the veracity of the prior statement
under oath at trial, the accuracy of the statement can then be
20. Id. at 316, 10 A. at 215. But see the strong dissent, Id. at 318, 10 A. at 302.
21. 223 Md. at 177, 162 A.2d at 761.
22. Id. at 176, 162 A.2d at 761.
23. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 738 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
24. Id. at 93, n.5.
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challenged during cross-examination. Consequently such state-
ments hardly pose real hearsay dangers."5
It is important to note that the U.S. Constitution may pose
an obstacle to the admission of prior statements in general. In
1945, on the basis of the sixth amendment confrontation clause,
the Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon 6 ruled against their ad-
mission. However, California v. Green,27 a 1970 case, muddled the
issue. There the Court said that the confrontation clause does not
require the exclusion of prior statements of a witness who con-
cedes making them, but now denies their truth and is available
for cross-examination concerning them.28
In Wilson v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
has ruled that parties using prior consistent statements to refresh
the recollection cannot offer them in evidence. The court has also
stated that admissibility of these statements as past recollection
recorded requires lack of present memory by the witness. In light
of Maryland's liberal policy regarding admission of prior identifi-
cations, 9 and considering the confusion caused by the failure to
discuss the Owens v. State and Hall v. State cases, the language
used by the court might seem somewhat unjustified. Perhaps the
court failed to come to grips sufficiently with these ramifications.
EVIDENCE- "DEAD MAN'S" STATUTE-ACCIDENTAL KILLING
NOT A TRANSACTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STAT-
UTE-Schifanelli v. Wallace.1
Defendant Wallace inflicted a fatal bullet wound upon his
wife in their bedroom. In his trial for manslaughter a guilty
verdict was set aside before sentencing and defendant was given
probation without verdict.2 The personal representative of the
25. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 738 (Chadbourne rev. 1970); Morgan, supra note 6,
at 196.
26. 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1949).
27. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
28. Id. at 164.
29. See note 14, supra.
1. 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974).
2. This eradicated the guilty verdict under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1973). See
Bartlett v. State, 15 Md. App. 234, 289 A.2d 843 (1972), aff'd mem., 267 Md. 530, 298
A.2d 16 (1973). In Maryland, manslaughter may be classified as either voluntary or invol-
untary. E.g., Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 569, 150 A.2d 251, 254 (1959); Rolfes v. State,
1974]
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wife's estate brought a suit in equity, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment to require the payment of proceeds of decedent's life insur-
ance policy to her estate rather than to defendant, the policy's
named beneficiary.
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County allowed defen-
dant to testify, over objection, about both alleged subjective feel-
ings (that he loved his wife, harbored no jealous feelings toward
her, and did not shoot her intentionally) and his alleged objective
actions (including statements of how the revolver was discharged
and a description of the bedroom's layout) .3 The chancellor deter-
mined that the shooting was a product of defendant's gross negli-
gence rather than a fulfillment of his intent and held that defen-
dant was the proper beneficiary and entitled to the proceeds of
the policy. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
this homicide was not a "transaction" within the meaning of the
Dead Man's Statute,4 and that although the intentional killing of
10 Md. App. 204, 206-07, 268 A.2d 795, 796 (1970). The negligent handling of a revolver
which results in another's death is normally involuntary manslaughter. Mills v. State, 13
Md. App. 196, 282 A.2d 147 (1971); Morris v. State, 4 Md. App. 328, 333, 242 A.2d 582,
585 (1968). Cf. 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 292 (1957). However, the
Maryland. statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 387 (1973), does not distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Cf. Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 558-59, 171
A.2d 699, 708 (1961). Thus, it is not necessary for a judge or jury to determine which form
of manslaughter occurred. Such was the case in defendant's criminal trial, and no finding
of his intent was made.
3. A denial of participation in a transaction, such as defendant's denial of intent,
may fall within the Dead Man's Statute. Jones v. Selvaggi, 216 Md. 1, 11, 139 A.2d 246,
251 (1958).
4. MD. ANN. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PRoc., § 9-116 (1974) reads:
A party to a proceeding by or against a personal representative, heir, devisee,
distributee, or legatee, or by or against an incompetent person, may not testify
concerning any transaction with or statement made by the dead or incompetent
person, personally or through an agent since dead, unless called to testify by the
opposite party, or unless the testimony of the dead or incompetent person has been
given in evidence in the same proceeding concerning the same transaction or state-
ment.
The Maryland Court of Appeals decided the appeal of the present case under the
former Dead Man's Statute:
In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators, heirs, devisees,
legatees or distributees of a decedent as such, in which judgments, or decrees may
be rendered for or against them, and in proceedings by or against persons incompe-
tent to testify by reason of mental disability, no party to the cause shall be allowed
to testify as to any transaction had with, or statement made by the testator, intes-
tate ancestor or party so incompetent to testify, either personally or through an
agent since dead, lunatic or insane, unless called to testify by the opposite party,
or unless the testimony of such testator, intestate, ancestor or party incompetent
to testify shall have already given in evidence, concerning the same transaction or
statement, in the same cause, on his or her own behalf or on behalf of his or her
representative in interest; nor shall it be competent, in any case, for any party to
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an insured by the named beneficiary disqualifies the beneficiary
from recovering the policy proceeds, a negligent killing does not.5
The Court of Appeals distinguished the subjective and objec-
tive testimony offered by defendant. The court admitted the
subjective testimony by applying two prior interpretations of the
statute's words "transaction had with":
[1] "'. . . The statute was intended to prevent one party
to a transaction from testifying to the acts and declarations
of a decedent whose acts are under consideration in a pro-
ceeding to which the witness is a party, to enforce obligations
arising from such transactions.
[2] . . .Whether, in case the witness testify falsely, the
deceased, if living, could contradict it of his own knowledge.'
Defendant's objective testimony was admitted by use of a third
test. Adopting the reasoning of an automobile negligence case,
Shaneybrook v. Blizzard,' the Schifanelli court interpreted
"transaction" to import a mutuality or concert of action, which
the court considered missing in the "fortuitous and involuntary"
the cause who has been examined therein as a witness, to corroborate his testimony
when impeached by proof of his own declaration or statement made to third persons
out of the presence and hearing of the adverse party; provided, however, this section
shall not apply to pending cases nor in anywise affect the present rights of litigants
therein.
Acts of 1904, ch. 661, § 2, [1904] Md. Laws 1168-69. The present revision constitutes no
alteration of the meaning of the word "transaction" for purposes of the present case.
5. It is settled law in Maryland that the beneficiary is disqualified from the recovery
of insurance proceeds for intentionally killing the insured. Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564,
150 A.2d 251 (1958); Burns v. United States, 200 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1952). Cf. Price v.
Hitafer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933).
Plaintiff attempted to expand this disqualification of a named beneficiary to include
a merely negligent killing of the insured, citing dicta of two English cases, Hall v. Knight
and Baxter [19141 P. 1, and Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, [1892] 1 Q.B.
147. The Maryland court declared these cases are not followed in the United States. 271
Md. at 189, 315 A.2d at 520. Preventing intentional killers from claiming insurance pro-
ceeds might discourage wilful homicidal activity. See Note, Acquisition of Property by
Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715 (1936). However,
since an accidental taker of life does not intend the death of the insured, depriving him
of insurance proceeds does not discourage homicides. If any further deterrent is needed,
criminal sanctions are still available. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 387 (1973).
6. 271 Md. at 184, 315 A.2d at 517, quoting Estate of Soothcage v. King, 227 Md.
142, 150, 176 A.2d 221, 226 (1961).
7. 271 Md. at 184, 315 A.2d at 517, quoting Ridgely, Ex'r. v. Beatty, 222 Md. 76,
83, 159 A.2d 651, 655 (1960). See Hollister v. Fiedler, 17 N.J. 239, 248, 111 A.2d 57, 62
(1955).
8. 209 Md. 304, 311-12, 121 A.2d. 218, 222 (1956).
658 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXXIV
relationship of both the drivers in Shaneybrook and the husband
and wife in the instant case.'
The Dead Man's Statute was intended to create a parity
among the parties by denying the survivor the right to testify
about a transaction with or statement by a deceased person who
could perhaps have refuted the former's version. 0 In so disallow-
ing the survivor from testifying, the estate of the deceased, which
might be without any other means of contradicting the survivor's
statements, would be protected against fraudulent claims."
Determining whether an event constitutes a transaction cre-
ates great difficulty in applying the statute. In factually indistin-
guishable cases, an accidental death resulting from negligent
driving of an automobile has been held to be a transaction in
some states,'2 but not to be a transaction in Maryland 3 or else-
where." Intentionally tortious acts have been held to constitute
9. 271 Md. at 184-87, 315 A.2d at 517-19.
10. Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 604, 116 A.2d 145, 149 (1955). Cf. Estate of Sooth-
cage v. King, 227 Md. 142, 176 A.2d 221 (1961).
At common law, in order to avoid perjury, no party to a lawsuit was competent to
testify in that suit. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2065 (3d ed. 1940); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 65 (1954). The Dead Man's Statute remains as a vestige of this disqualification.
11. See Snyder v. Crabbs, 263 Md. 28, 30, 282 A.2d 6, 8 (1971); Tillinghast v. Lamp,
168 Md. 34, 41, 176 A. 629, 631-32 (1935). However, the statute has been criticized for
working an unjust hardship upon the survivor to a transaction with the deceased. See 2
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (1954); Ray, Dead Man's
Statutes, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
The critics contend that the dead man's statutes place an unjust hardship upon the
survivor by disallowing legitimate claims and defenses against the estate of the deceased.
The premise of their argument is that there are more honest than dishonest men. Hence,
in seeking to prevent a fraud to the deceased's estate which might be committed by only
a few, certain injustice is brought to the greater number of legitimate surviving claimants
against the deceased's estate. It is also urged that the admission of evidence is of greater
importance than the possible protection offered to the deceased's estate. Determination
of ultimate facts may be left to juries. Any potential for fraud may be revealed in cross
examination by the estate. Finally, the critics contend that the statute prevents neither
perjury by a non-party having a pecuniary interest in the outcome (such as the survivor's
wife), nor the subornation of perjury by the survivor himself.
Accordingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals has construed the statute narrowly. See,
e.g., Stacy v. Burke, 259 Md. 390, 269 A.2d 837 (1970), where in a suit against a savings
and loan institution for allegedly allowing deceased's insurance policy to lapse, an agent
of the savings and loan was allowed to testify about her dealings with deceased; Guernsey
v. Loyola Fed. Ass'n, 226 Md. 77, 80, 172 A.2d 506, 507 (1961), where the court allowed
evidence concerning the intent of deceased in making a gift to his nephew.
12. Bruno v. Kramer, 176 Neb. 597, 126 N.W.2d 885 (1964); Zeigler v. Moore, 75
Nev. 91, 335 P.2d 425 (1959); Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1961).
13. Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304, 311, 121 A.2d 218, 222 (1956).
14. Harper v. Johnson, 345 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961); Turbot v. Repp, 247 Iowa 69,
72 N.W.2d 565 (1955); Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1961). Ray, supra note 11, is emphatic:
To classify an automobile collision as a "transaction" between the drivers of the
cars is to completely disregard the customary and ordinary meaning of the word.
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transactions," although the Maryland Court of Appeals has never
decided this issue.16
Rather than devising one test which would define the para-
meter of a "transaction" and further the ends of the statute, the
Schifanelli court relied upon three tests, none of which ade-
quately encompassed the testimony offered by the defendant.
The Estate of Soothcage v. King7 test, which emphasizes dece-
dent's actions that create obligations, was improperly applied to
admit defendant's subjective testimony, and it is inadequate to
define all "transactions." The test prevents a party witness from
testifying to the acts and declarations of a decedent.'" In
Schifanelli the issue was not the admissibility of testimony of
decedent's conduct, but rather the admission of testimony con-
cerning the party witness' own feeling. Limited by the type of
proceeding and scope of evidence to which it applies, the
It is unbelievable that the legislatures, in seeking to protect estates of decedents
from false claims, could have intended to include in "transaction" such an involun-
tary and fortuitous contact as an automobile collision. Such decisions are not only
unwarranted judicial extensions of the statute, but they create an intolerable injus-
tice in denying the survivor the right to give his story to the triers.
24 OHIO ST. L.J. at 102 (1963). See also Stout, Should the Dead Man's Statute Apply to
Automobile Collisions?, 38 Txx. L. REV. 14 (1959).
15. See Clark v. Douglas, 39 W.Va. 691, 81 S.E.2d 112 (1954), where a dead man's
statute was applied to bar the survivor of an intentional shooting by the deceased from
describing the event in her suit against the deceased's estate. There, the court stated:
[T]he testimony must be viewed in the light of the circumstance and other evi-
dence before the jury and, when so viewed it told the jury who fired the shot that
injured her . . . . In such circumstances the testimony of plaintiff told the jury
plainly and definitely that [deceased] was the person who fired the shot and
constituted testimony of plaintiff of "a personal transaction or communication"
with (deceased].
Id. at 695, 81 S.E.2d at 114-15. Viewed in this manner, the West Virginia court would
probably have found a transaction to have occurred in Schifanelli. Cf. Maciejczak v.
Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P.2d 31 (1936).
16. Schifanelli, 271 Md. at 186, 315 A.2d at 518.
17. 227 Md. 142, 176 A.2d 221 (1961).
18. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. The application of this test in a verbal
contract context, for example, would allow the survivor to testify that he accepted the offer
made by decedent, but would disqualify his testimony concerning the nature of the offer.
The Court of Appeals originally used the test to explain the Dead Man's Statute's
inapplicability in caveat proceedings, such as Soothcage:
The practice in this State has been to permit caveators and caveatees to testify on
the trial of issues framed on caveats to wills. They are not proceedings "In which
judgments or decree may be rendered for or against them," as no judgment is
entered in the law Court where they are tried. . . . [Olur reports show that cavea-
tors and caveatees have been without question permitted to testify since the present
[Dead Man's] statute was passed . ...
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 131 Md. 508, 510-11, 102 A. 761, 762 (1917). Cf. Griffith v. Benzin-
ger, 144 Md. 575, 125 A. 512 (1924).
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Soothcage test does not reach all "transactions," and is unsuit-
able as a general standard.
The second test offered by the Schifanelli court to admit the
subjective testimony concerned the deceased's ability, if the de-
ceased were still living, to contradict defendant's testimony of
intention. 9 The court believed that the deceased would not have
been able to contradict this testimony, seemingly because intent
is an abstraction, existing solely within the mind of the actor. 0
Yet, in criminal law, a homicidal intention is determinable by the
finders of fact on the basis of an overt, physical manifestation.'
If defendant did intentionally shoot his wife, the deceased, if
living, may have been able to contradict the testimony by her own
knowledge, perhaps by testifying about threatening words uttered
by defendant, or about his threatening demeanor immediately
prior to the shooting. The court, however, accepted the chancel-
lor's finding of negligence.22 This mechanical affirmation allowed
defendant to overcome a presumption that the shooting was in-
tentional.2 3 With negligence rather than intention as a starting
point, it was a simple process for the court to find no transaction
to have occurred, and thereby admit the testimony.
The Schifanelli court admitted the objective testimony of the
defendant by applying its third test, from Shaneybrook.24 There,
accidental death as a result of negligent automobile driving was
held not to constitute a transaction, because the death was the
product of a "fortuitous and involuntary" relationship. In finding
the shooting death of Mrs. Wallace to be "involuntary, fortui-
19. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
20. 271 Md. at 184, 315 A.2d at 517.
21. In a criminal assault case with a fact pattern similar to that in Schifanelli, the
court stated:
The deliberate selection and use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the
body is a circumstance which indicates a design to kill, since in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that one intends the natural and proba-
ble consequences of his act.
Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 52, 102 A.2d 816, 819-20 (1954). Cf. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
535; Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 95 A.2d 577 (1953); People v. Carter, 410 Ill. 462, 102
N.E.2d 312 (1951).
22. In the appeal of a case brought in equity, the court may review the facts found
by the trial court as well as the law applied by the trial court. Cf. Tillinghast v. Lamp,
168 Md. 34, 41, 176 A. 629, 632 (1935); Gallagher v. Garrett, 144 Md. 241, 247, 124 A. 898,
900 (1923); Cooke v. Cooke, 41 Md. 362, 371 (1875).
23. See Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 569, 150 A.2d 251, 254 (1959), where in a civil
suit against a named beneficiary of an insurance policy, the Davis presumption (see note
21 supra) was followed: "The use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body
may be evidence, among other facts, of a specific intent to take life."
24. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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tous" and lacking the "mutuality of concert of action" of a trans-
action, the Schifanelli court indulged in circular reasoning, and
tacitly assumed the shooting to be an unintentional act. The
couple's relationship at the instant of the gun's firing lacked
"mutuality" only if the shooting was accidental, and not the
product of a "mutual" marital spat or physical struggle. 5 This
conclusion is readily reached by the admission of defendant's
testimony of his lack of intention to shoot his wife. However, this
testimony is permissible only if the evidence offered did not relate
to a transaction. Nevertheless, the court concluded no transac-
tion occurred since the shooting was fortuitous. 6
In addition to the above problems, the tests do not reflect
basic evidentiary principles. Although commentators point out
the entire Dead Man's Statute is an aberration,"2 the majority of
states (including Maryland) continue its existence. Given the
statute and its purpose,8 the best tests of a "transaction" are
whether the actual affair could give rise to a cause of action,29 and
whether the unusually great potential for falsehood, in the ab-
sence of a living adverse party witness, could be avoided by ex-
cluding certain testimony.3 The former test insures that the testi-
25. See Clark v. Douglas, 139 W.Va. 691, 81 S.E.2d 112 (1954). There, the survivor-
plaintiff, a niece of the deceased's former wife, was living in the home of the deceased and
testified at trial that the deceased had shot her while in her bedroom. However, her
testimony on this point was eradicated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
applying the dead man's statute. See note 15 supra.
26. 271 Md. at 187, 315 A.2d at 519. A death caused by automobile negligence,
such as in Shaneybrook, may well be presumed to be "fortuitous and involuntary," as may
a death caused by dental malpractice (271 Md. at 187, 315 A.2d at 518), but a presumption
of intention attaches to death by gunfire. See notes 21 and 23 and accompanying text
supra.
27. See note 11 supra.
28. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
29. Riley v. Lukens Dredging and Contracting Corp., 4 F. Supp. 144 (D.Md. 1933).
In Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry., 100 Minn. 79, 110 N.W. 356, 358 (1907), "transaction"
was defined as "any occurrences or affairs the result of which vests in a party the right to
maintain an action, whether the occurrences be in the nature of tort or otherwise." Cf.
Shellady, Inc. v. Herlihy, 236 Md. 461, 473, 204 A.2d 504, 510 (1964); Miles v. Brainin,
224 Md. 156, 164-65, 167 A.2d 117, 121 (1961); Estate of Soothcage v. King, 227 Md. 142,
176 A.2d 221 (1961); Shaffer v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 300 Mo. 477, 254 S.W. 257 (1923);
King v. Coe Comm'n Co., 93 Minn. 52, 100 N.W. 667 (1904).
Even if this interpretation of "transaction" were to be accepted, it might be argued
that the deceased's estate has no right to maintain an action. There are dicta in Maryland
cases which state that no cause of action may arise in tort between husband and wife,
Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927), or that the maintenance of
such a suit is prohibited during coverture, Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d
886 (1957); David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1931). However, no Maryland case
has specifically held this spousal immunity to apply to intentional torts, and the
Schifanelli court did not reach this question.
30. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
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mony to be offered is necessary for the fact finder to determine
liability, while the latter test establishes evidentiary reliability.
Even where a transaction is determined, testimony would be
admissible according to the Dead Man's Statute if the evidence
in question had already been admitted in testimony of the de-
ceased, prior to his death. Additionally, if any adverse corrobora-
tion3 is available (as it was in Schifane li), evidentiary reliability
is furnished, and this testimony should be admissible.32 Applying
this novel framework to Schifanelli, defendant could have testi-
fied to his love for his wife and his lack of jealousy (subjective) 33
as well as to the layout of the bedroom,3' since these statements
enjoyed adverse corroboration. Expert testimony corroborating
defendant's statement concerning the nature of the revolver's fir-
ing mechanism (objective) was elicited by questioning by the
chancellor without objection. 35 However, no witness could have
possibly corroborated defendant's statement that the shooting
was not committed intentionally. Since the shooting did give rise
to a cause of action and created a substantial potential for false-
hood which would harm the decedent's estate, defendant's denial
of intent should have been excluded. The husband's testimony
31. Adverse corroboration is to be limited to testimony already introduced by the
estate. It is not to be confused with hostile corroboration which the statute bars. See note
32 infra.
This proposed rule is merely an application of a pre-existing rule of evidence recog-
nized in Maryland, that otherwise inadmissable evidence may be admitted if similar
admissable evidence has been introduced by the adverse party. Calvert County Comm'rs
v. Gantt, 78 Md. 286, 28 A. 101 (1893); Milburn v. State, 1 Md. 1 (1851); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 58 (1972).
32. Allowing the survivor to testify about the transaction only when adverse corro-
boration is present greatly reduces the potential for subornation of perjury by the survivor.
Maryland has held that mere corroborative testimony of a witness does not remove
the bar of the Dead Man's Statute. Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 603-04, 116 A.2d 145,
149 (1955). Cf. Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635, 641, 51 A.2d 264, 267 (1947). However,
in both Ortel and Cearfoss the corroborative testimony was offered by a witness called by
the disqualified survivor. Schifanelli can be distinguished from these two cases since the
testimony of the survivor was corroborated by witnesses for the adverse party. Admission
of defendant's statements on these points would not jeopardize the underpinnings to the
policy of these cases. Defendant could not suborn perjury to corroborate his own perjured
statements, since adverse testimony is involved. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (1954).
Thus the statute's purpose of preventing frauds upon the deceased's estate is satisfied.
See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
33. Record at 47, where deceased's sister, a witness for plaintiff, testified that de-
ceased and defendant had a close and loving relationship.
34. 271 Md. at 185, 315 A.2d at 517, where plaintiff offered police testimony and a
photograph of the bedroom taken by police shortly after the shooting.
35. Id. at 181, 315 A.2d at 515, where a police ballistics expert called by plaintiff
described the revolver's firing mechanism in an identical manner to defendant's descrip-
tion.
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concerning his intent was certainly relevant, but its unreliability
far outweighed its necessity.
By allowing the husband's denial of intent into evidence, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has further narrowed the scope of the
Dead Man's Statute. This suggests that the definition of "trans-
action" will include only events in which deceased and survivor
work jointly toward some goal. Such an approach would exclude
application of the Statute to most tortious activity.
MECHANICS' LIENS-ABANDONMENT OF CONSTRUC-
TION-FIFTEEN-MONTH SUSPENSION OF CONSTRUCTION, RENEGO-
TIATION OF CONTRACT PRICE, AND MINOR CHANGES IN PLANS HELD
NOT TO PREVENT RELATION BACK TO DATE OF ORIGINAL
COMMENCEMENT - Frank J. Klein & Sons v. Laudeman'
In early 1967 Mr. and Mrs. Spottswood Bird obtained tempo-
rary zoning approval for the construction of a nursing home.
Joined by Willis Hindman, a co-promoter, the Birds secured the
services of Carroll W. Hynes Builder, Inc. to assist in designing
the home. Hynes submitted plans, specifications, and a construc-
tion bid. In January of 1969 Hynes began construction work in
order to prevent the imminent expiration of the zoning certificate
and construction permit. By early spring the foundation had been
laid, but because of difficulties in obtaining state approval, bank
financing, and completion bonds, construction ceased in April
and did not resume until July of 1970. Following this resumption,
the work continued uninterrupted until completion in 1971.
During the idle period, weeds grew over the site, the contract
price was renegotiated, and minor changes were made in the
building plans. In addition, the promoters, with Hynes' assis-
tance, continued their efforts to remove the obstacles that had
delayed the project. A $200,000 loan, secured by a deed of trust,
was obtained from Baltimore Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion. This deed of trust was recorded prior to the resumption of
work.
Subsequent to completion of the project, Baltimore Federal
foreclosed and Hynes, along with two subcontractors, filed me-
chanics' lien claims.' The mechanics' lien claimants argued that
1. 270 Md. 152, 311 A.2d 780 (1973).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 1 (1972) provides:
Every building erected .. in Baltimore City and in any of the counties shall be
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their liens were entitled to priority under section fifteen of the
Maryland mechanics' lien statute because the deed of trust had
been recorded subsequent to the commencement of the building.3
The trial judge denied priority to the mechanics' liens on the
subject to a lien for the payment of all debts contracted for work done for or about
the same .... However, no building or the land on which it sits shall be subject
to a lien as set forth above, if it shall be proved by evidence that all moneys due
for work contracted and materials furnished ...has been paid to such persons,
firms or corporations who have actually performed the labor, supplied the materials
and said building has been conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice.
At the time the dispute involved in Laudeman arose, the mechanics' lien provisions
were codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, §§ 1-33 (1972). They are now codified at MD. ANN.
CODE, Real Prop. Art., §§ 9-101 to 9-113 (1974). The provisions of former section one of
article 63 are now contained in section 9-101 of the Real Property Article. The language
has been modernized but no substantive changes relevant to the present discussion have
been made.
Mechanics' liens were unknown at common law; they are entirely creatures of statute.
For general background discussion of mechanics' lien law, see S. PHn.LI'S, MEcANics'
LIENS ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY (1874); Cutler and Shapiro, The Maryland Me-
chanics' Lien Law-Its Scope and Effect, 28 MD. L. REv. 225 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Cutler and Shapiro]. Maryland's statute, the first in the United States, was adopted in
1791. Id. at 225.
As this issue of the Review goes to press, the constitutionality of the Maryland proce-
dure for enforcing mechanics' liens is being challenged. Basing his conclusion on Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973), an
equity master for the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City found that the procedure violates
due process. Caplan Bros. v. The Village of Cross Keys, Inc., The Daily Record (Balti-
more), Feb. 1, 1975, at 2, col. 1. The master found the following factors determinative:
(1) there is no adequate notice requirement; (2) there is no opportunity for the owner to
be heard before the lien is perfected; (3) the lien is perfected as a ministerial function of
a state official with insufficient authority to review the validity of the claim; and (4) the
owner must take affirmative action and incur expense to eliminate a lien which may have
no validity. See generally 34 MD. L. REv. 441 (1974). But see Spielman-Fond, Inc. v.
Hanson's Inc., 417 U.S. 901 (1974), aff'g mrnem., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973) (three-
judge court); Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (three-judge court);
Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 (D. S. Dak. 1973). Each of these cases found me-
chanics' lien statutes containing provisions similar to those under attack in Caplan Bros.
to be consistent with due process.
Since the Laudeman case involves merely the determination of when the lien attaches
for priority purposes, a decision that the enforcement procedure is unconstitutional would
not affect Laudeman's vitality. In all probability, the legislature would respond to an
adverse adjudication by simply amending the statute to conform to due process require-
ments; other parts of the statute would remain in force.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 15 (1972) provides:
The lien hereby given shall be preferred to all mortgages, judgments, liens and
encumbrances which attach upon the said building or the ground covered thereby
subsequently to the commencement thereof; and all the mortgages and liens other
than liens which have attached thereto prior to the commencement of the said
building and which by the laws of this State are required to be recorded shall be
postponed to said lien, unless recorded prior to the commencement of said building.
Section fifteen has been recodified, with stylistic changes, at MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop.
Art., § 9-107(b) (1974).
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ground that the work performed from January to April of 1969
was not the "commencement of [a] building" within the mean-
ing of section fifteen.4 As an alternative basis for his decision, the
judge found that the project had been abandoned after perform-
ance of the initial work; therefore, he reasoned, the lien could not
relate back to that date.5 The Court of Appeals, holding that both
of these findings were clearly erroneous, reversed.
Since the adoption of the Maryland mechanics' lien statute
in 1791,1 the Court of Appeals has on several occasions explored
the meaning of the term "commencement" in section fifteen,7 but
until the Laudeman case, the court had never been faced with the
issues raised by the trial judge's finding of abandonment.'
The court first considered the appellants' contention that
"'Maryland does not recognize that the 'commencement' of con-
struction once vested . . . may be abandoned by a delay in the
construction thus dating the attachment of liens. . from a 're-
commencement.' "" Since the term "abandonment" does not
appear in the statute, the appellants had a colorable argument
on this point. In rejecting this argument, the court said that
"[tlhe issue more correctly stated is whether there has been
sufficient cessation of work to constitute the end of construction
on one project and the initiation of work on another."'10 Thus, the
resumption of work on an abandoned project will have the same
legal effect as the initiation of work on a totally different project;
the lien will relate back to the date of the "commencement" of
the "second" project, not the "first.""
4. 270 Md. at 156, 311 A.2d at 782-83.
5. Id. at 159, 311 A.2d at 784.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. See Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 230 Md. 573, 188 A.2d 146 (1963); Kelly v.
Rosenstock, 45 Md. 389 (1876); Jean v. John W. Wilson & Son, 38 Md. 288 (1873); Brooks
v. Lester, 36 Md. 65 (1872); Cutler and Shapiro, note 2, supra at 244-45.
8. In Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 230 Md. 573, 579, 188 A.2d 146, 148-49 (1963),
the court said that the "abandonment" of construction on a 120-unit apartment project
in order to build a 48-unit project on the same site might prevent relation back to the date
of original commencement. However, the court did not decide the case on this issue.
9. 270 Md. at 159, 311 A.2d at 784.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. The court indicated that abandonment will not prevent priority with respect to
the previously completed work: "[A] lien attaches to an individual project and if there
is an [abandonment], only the construction performed before work ceases . . . has a lien
priority." Id. at 160, 311 A.2d at 785 (emphasis added). From this dictum it would seem
to follow that mechanics' lien claimants can collect in a situation in which a building has
been only partially constructed. Query: Is this consistent with section one of the statute,
which states that "[elvery building erected ... shall be subject to a lien"? MD. ANN.
CoDE art. 63, § 1 (1972) (emphasis added).
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Turning to the factual question, the court said that this de-
termination "becomes an inquiry into intention."' 2 Thus, "[i]f
the initial desire to complete a project dissipates to such a degree
that construction stops with no intention at that time of ever
proceeding as originally planned,"'3 the project will be deemed
abandoned.
After stating the applicable standard, the court set forth
guidelines to be utilized in applying the standard. The intention
to abandon may be objectively manifested by "a material change
of design under a new contract, or a complete stoppage of work
for a period of time sufficient in duration to exhibit an intention
completely incompatible with any desire to finish the original
structure, or other strong evidence of such an intent."' 4 Further,
the court explained that the "mere modification of a plan would
not be sufficient"; 5 the finished structure must be "essentially
different from the one first planned,"' 6 that is, a "different build-
ing."17
Applying these guidelines to the evidence, the court found
that only the following factors relied on by the trial judge were
relevant: work had ceased for fifteen months, the contract price
had been renegotiated, and minor changes had been made in the
construction plan. Although conceding that the lengthy delay was
significant, the court observed that it "was due to a snafu not
unheard of' in the course of such projects,' and that the continu-
ing efforts to overcome this "snafu" demonstrated an intention
to complete the project. Finally, the court found that the changes
in contract price and building plans did not amount to "material
12. 270 Md. at 160, 311 A.2d at 785.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 161, 311 A.2d at 785.
16. Id.
17. Id., quoting Norris' Appeal, 30 Pa. 122, 125 (1858). Norris' Appeal involved an
owner who had begun constructing a saw factory according to plans calling for the manu-
facture of saws by hand. Later, however, he decided to use steam power; this necessitated
construction of several additional buildings. In passing on the question of whether aban-
donment had occurred the court stated the test as follows: "[W]as the whole establish-
ment erected on substantially one plan and design from the commencement, or was the
plan or design so materially changed during the progress of the work as to make the whole
a different building from that which was or would have been erected had no such change
taken place?" (emphasis added). The court decided that abandonment had occurred and
therefore denied priority to claimants who had performed work on the additional buildings
subsequent to the recording of a mortgage on the property. See also Haxtun Steam-Heater
Co. v. Gordon, 2 N.D. 246, 50 N.W. 708 (1891) (substitution of steam heat for stoves did
not prevent relation back).
18. 270 Md. at 163, 311 A.2d at 786.
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change of design under a new contract."'" Therefore, under the
court's definition of abandonment, the trial judge's resolution of
the issue was held to be clearly erroneous.
The Laudeman decision necessarily leaves many questions
unresolved. Determining what constitutes "a material change of
design under a new contract" is left to future cases. The question
whether a lengthy and unexplained delay will support a finding
of abandonment is likewise unanswered. What may be "other
strong evidence" of intention to abandon is a matter for specula-
tion. Laudeman does make clear, however, that fact-finders must
focus on intention, not the appearance of the construction site.
Examination of the sparse case law from other jurisdictions
indicates that the Laudeman court's approach to the abandon-
ment problem is generally consistent with the prevailing view.20
A very different approach, however, is suggested by a Florida
court in Mack Industries, Inc. v. Donald W. Nelson, Inc.21 Evi-
dence in that case indicated that excavation and filling opera-
tions were performed on a construction site in the summer of
1959, but that no further work was performed until about four
months later; in the interim, a deed of trust had been recorded.
Further evidence indicated that at the time the deed of trust was
recorded the growth of weeds over the site rendered it difficult to
ascertain, by an inspection of the site, that this work had been
performed. The trial court denied priority to the mechanics' liens
on the ground that there had been no visible commencement.
The Florida appellate court, affirming the decision, said that
the trial court "was entitled to find that the construction was not
prosecuted with reasonable promptness so as to render the opera-
tions sufficiently manifest and substantial to notify interested
persons that work was progressing or that there had been no
material abandonment. 2 2 Although the opinion contains no
discussion of intention, the above passage suggests that regard-
less of evidence of an intention to continue, the appearance of the
site is the controlling factor in determining whether a project has
been abandoned.
The objective "visibility" approach suggested by Mack
Industries has the appeal of simplicity and certainty of applica-
19. Id.
20. See Brettschneider v. Wellman, 230 Minn. 225, 41 N.W.2d 255 (1950); Federal
Land Bank v. Green, 180 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489 (1939); Gorden v. Torrey, 15 N.J.Eq. 112
(1862). Cf. Dickason Goodman Lumber Co. v. Foresman, 120 Okla. 168, 251 P. 70 (1926).
21. 134 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1961).
22. Id. at 824-25.
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tion; its adoption in Maryland would facilitate secured lending.
Instead of exploring the vagaries of subjective intention, as re-
quired by Laudeman, a court following the Mack Industries ap-
proach would simply focus its attention on the condition of the
premises. Likewise, prospective lenders, after inspecting the land
that is to provide the security, could determine with reasonable
certainty whether their liens will have priority over possible me-
chanics' liens. Such determinations would necessarily involve
some guesswork, but the amount of guesswork would not be
nearly as great as that required by application of the Laudeman
standard.
A clue to the Laudeman court's reason for adopting an "in-
tention" approach to the problem was provided by its observation
that the court "must bear in mind that the purpose of the me-
chanics' lien law is to protect the materialmen and that this law
is to be construed in the most liberal and comprehensive manner
in their favor."23 Adopting a "visibility" approach would proba-
bly be detrimental to mechanics' lien claimants because priority
would be denied where, without fault on their part, delays in
construction have resulted in the appearance of abandonment.
Such a result would be inconsistent with the court's interpreta-
tion of the purpose of the statute.
However one views the merits of the Laudeman approach, it
seems clear from the decision that prospective lenders who find
evidence of prior construction work on land that is to provide
their security cannot, simply because the work appears to have
been abandoned, assume that their mortgages or deeds of trust
will have priority over mechanics' liens for work and materials
subsequently supplied; instead, they must inquire further before
taking action. Since it may be difficult to discover the strong
evidence of an intention to abandon that Laudeman requires,
lending institutions will probably have to assume, for planning
purposes, that their liens will be subordinate to possible mechan-
ics' liens.
23. 270 Md. at 162, 311 A.2d at 785-86.
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